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LEGAL INSTITUTIONS AND POLLUTION:
SOME INTERSECTIONS
BETWEEN LAW AND HISTORY
JAN G. LAITOS*

Most of the pollution control policies that appear in the reporters,
statutes, and ordinances of the 1970s are not original responses to
environmental problems. Rather, their function and form imply the
acceptance of certain affirmative decisions and negative constraints
that incorporate value judgments of the past.
Our legal past can be roughly divided into three eras. From 1800
to 1880 (nineteenth century I), commonly-shared premises concerning the perceived benefits of increased productivity through market
processes made strong demands on the legal system. Law generously
responded to these pressures by protecting the profit-maximizing
behavior of men in the American market and, in general, supporting
policies that advanced economic values.' From 1880 to 1930
(twentieth century I), rather than passively resigning control to other
factors in society, law assumed more of an active stance. For the first
time the legal process began to address some of the long-run social
costs that had been generated (and then subordinated) by the nineteenth century I emphasis on short-term economic gain. After 1930
(twentieth century II), use of law to regulate economic behavior was
not only generally accepted, it was expected.
*Office of Legal Counsel, Dept. of Justice.
1. The nineteenth century I view of the economy, embodied in the law of property,
contract, and torts was predicated on a faith in short-term, market-directed productivity.
The nineteenth century I entrepreneur also believed that law should provide mechanisms for
mobilizing scarce capital, and for devolving resources on private interests toward the goal of
maximizing growth in exchange values. See J. Hurst, Law and the Conditions of Freedom in
the 19th Century United States (1956) [hereinafter cited as Conditions of Freedom] ; Hurst,
The Uses of Law in Four "Colonial" States of the American Union, 1945 Wis. L. Rev. 577,
583.
The early nineteenth century concern for economic considerations manifested itself in a
wide variety of constitutional, common law and statutory forms. For example, popular
pressures for reapportionment were often linked to economic policy questions; when underrepresented districts in the South failed to get their full share of state expenditures this
impelled them to seek constitutional reform. F. Green, Constitutional Development in the
South Atlantic States, 1776-1860, at 150-52 (1930). The common law doctrine of caveat
emptor refused to imply warranties, promoting instead a rapid interchange of commodities
free from the threat of subsequent litigation. See McFarland v. Newman, 9 Watts 55 (Pa.
1839). And state legislatures pressed for the mobilization of scarce capital to construct the
canals, turnpikes and other bulk transport facilities that would provide revenue and open
markets. See R. Shaw, Erie Water West: A History if the Erie Canal, 1792-1854 (1966).

NA TURAL RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

The role of the law changed most dramatically in twentieth century I. In nineteenth century I, extra-legal economic forces shaped
the style and function of policy-making. But in twentieth century I
law itself had begun to have a positive impact on informal market
behavior. By then law was beginning to influence the routine
decisions of private actors by forcing entrepreneurs to consider and
assess the effect of law on activities that had heretofore been limited
only by the unregulated laws of supply and demand.2
Nowhere is this shift in legal emphasis from nineteenth century I
market-protector to twentieth century I market-regulator more
evident than in the law's relationship to the air pollution problem.
Throughout most of nineteenth century I, law and its institutions
refused to control the air pollution nuisance when to do so might
have jeopardized the economic potential of the privately-owned
property that typically caused the pollution.' In twentieth century I,
though, laws began to force private decision-makers to absorb the
"external" costs of polluting activities by making those activities
seem more expensive and less attractive. State legislatures enacted
enabling statutes giving municipalities the power to regulate air pollution;4 cities in turn responded by passing ordinances declaring the
emission of "dense smoke" to constitute a nuisance.' Courts usually
upheld the constitutionality of this legislation. 6 In some instances,
plaintiffs suffering from particularly offensive air pollution nuisances
were granted common law or equitable relief.'
2. This article will not attempt the near-impossible task of accurately measuring the
extent to which people took account of legal rules in their activities. People may have found
the impact to be so small in certain cases that they could safely ignore the law. On the other
hand, in some areas the impact of law may have been so great that decisionmakers would
have to assess carefully the costs and benefits imposed by legal rules before pursuing a
course of action. Indeed, it would be quite difficult ever authoritatively to assert which
factor in an entrepreneur's decision-legal rule, money supply, consumer demand, psychological quirk-provided the impulse for any specific choice. Thus, rather than trying to
measure the law's impact, this essay shall assess how legal rules affect private decisions in
terms of the direction of the impact.
3. See Laitos, Continuities From Our Legal Past Affecting Resource Use and Conservation Patterns, 28 Okla. L. Rev. 60 (1975).
4. See, e.g., Ohio Rev. St. § 1692a [1890]: "... in all cities of the second grade of the
first class, such cities shall have the power to regulate and compel the consumption of the
smoke emitted by the burning of coal. .. "
5. See, e.g., Detroit, Mich., Rev. Ordinances ch. 67 [1890], stating in part: "The emission from any chimney or smokestack within the city of dense smoke ... shall be deemed a
public nuisance."
6. See, ex parte Junqua, 10 Cal. App. 602, 103 P. 159 (1909), in which the court upheld
a Sacramento ordinance prohibiting the escape of soot from smoke stacks using distillate or
crude oil.
7. See, Judson v. Los Angeles Suburban Gas Co., 157 Cal. 168, 106 P. 581 (1910). In
Judson a California appellate court upheld the granting of an injunction and judgment for
damages against defendant's gas works.
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Such apparent regulatory vigor, coupled with the tendency on the
part of reviewing courts to uphold smoke nuisance ordinances and
statutes against constitutional attack, have led commentators to conclude optimistically that law has been a forceful advocate for the
control of air pollution over the last 100 years.8 More significantly,
lawmakers have similarly concluded that use of law to achieve atmospheric purity in the past justifies continued and even more vigorous
uses of the law today in twentieth century II. But are these conclusions correct?
This article is premised on two assumptions: (1) Before we use law
to affect natural use decisions we should first understand the limitations of legal processes; and (2) These limitations are best revealed by
studying how law failed or succeeded in the past. It is the thesis of
this essay that a study of the legal history of the twentieth century I
period will reveal a continuing underlying tension affecting the use of
law as a tool for pollution control. While it is true that the pre-1930
era recorded several positive law-making efforts that developed and
communicated the major working principles of today's air pollution
control law, twentieth century I law also contained features that
thwarted the law's impact on the air pollution problem then, and by
their stubborn persistence in the legal process, continue to limit law's
impact on the pollution problem today.
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONTEXT: SETTING THE STAGE FOR
STRONGER LEGAL CONTROLS ON ENVIRONMENTAL USE
Prior to 1880 the dominant social and economic institution which
both affected and implemented men's choices was the market. Men
had an ideal picture of the impersonal market as a beneficent institution because they saw in it key positive and negative values. Positively, as the market sanctioned sustained bargaining among individuals over the use of assets, it fostered the most energetic use of
limited capital, manpower, and managerial talent. This positive virtue
seen in the market reflected a more general idea prevalent in nineteenth century I-that economic productivity was the lever by which
men could live a better life. Negatively, it was believed that such a
broad pattern of bargaining prevented the market's outcome from
ever being grossly biased in favor of any particular segment of private
8. See generally S. Edelman, The Law of Air Pollution Control (1970); Kennedy, Fifty
Years of Air Pollution Law (presented at the 50th Annual Meeting of the Air Pollution
Control Association, St. Louis, June 2-6, 1957); Kennedy & Porter, Air Pollution: Its
Control and Abatement, 8 Vand. L. Rev. 854 (1955); German, Regulation of Smoke and
Air Pollution in Pennsylvania, 10 U. Pitt. L. Rev. 493 (1949); McQuillin, Abatement of the
Smoke Nuisance in Large Cities, 46 Cent. L. J. 147 (1898).
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interest. This negative virtue reflected an idea that was brought to
special definition in our legal institutions-that all forms of power
were so open to abuse as to be distrusted, and hence a premium
should be put on arrangements (of which the market was a prime
example) that kept power in healthy balance.
By 1880 however, changes in social and economic arrangements
drastically altered the form and function of the nineteenth century I
market. Pre-1880 America had been preoccupied with the economic
challenge of physical and social circumstance. Beginning around
1880, America's legal, political, and economic institutions had to
concern themselves with the general organization and effects of
power concentrations. The rapid settlement of cities, the growth of
urban living, and a large increase in population had led to social
configurations that overshadowed individual lives. The startling pace
of the industrial revolution had stimulated the growth of factories;
men lived in the midst of machinery, mines, railroads, and automobiles. New business inventions, such as the trust and holding
company, underscored the extent to which individualism had given
way to concentrations of financial and economic power. By the turn
of the century, a simple market of numerous bargaining entrepreneurs had largely disappeared. In its place was the beginning of a new
era of big industry, big finance, big cities, and an increasing interdependence of activities between them. 9
9. The transformation ot an agriculturally-based rural society characteristic of nineteenth
century I to the urban industrial economy of the post-1880 era was one of the most
significant changes in our nation's history. In 1860 the United States was a second-rate
industrial country, lagging far behind England, France and Germany. But by 1890 the
United States had stepped into first place, its manufacturing productivity had multiplied ten
times over, and the value of its manufactured goods almost equaled the combined production of all three of the former leaders. Indeed, the twentieth century I generation introduced changes of such order that they made a new nation.
To explain adequately the reasons for these changes is beyond the scope and purpose of
this article. It is certain, though, that law, government and lawyers were significant causative
and supportive factors in the growth and expansion of the American economy. Throughout
the last third of the nineteenth century government was largely controlled by men who were
not only responsive to the wishes of business, but also eager to further the interests of mass
markets and mass production. Law makers used the prevailing "laissez faire" philosophy to
justify the virtual absence of effective restraints on the business community. When government intervened it was to extend loans, grant subsidies and franchises, hand over public
resources, and protect home industries from foreign competitors. The Civil War had eliminated the Southern planter as a rival of the industrialist for control in Washington. No other
economic faction, except for the short-lived Granger movement, offered effective competition for the attention and favor of state legislators. Moreover, unlike European businessmen,
Americans had no heritage of canon law and feudal custom with which to contend; no royal
prerogatives or aristocratic privileges barred James J. Hill (railroads), J. P. Morgan (banking),
Andrew Carnegie (steel), or John D. Rockefeller (oil).
For a detailed history and analysis of this period, see generally T. Cochran & A. Bining,
The Rise of American Economic Life (1964); E. Kirkland, Industry Comes of Age: Business,
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The years between 1880 and 1900 were also a period in which
large numbers of people first began to take notice of issues pertaining
to natural resource use. This fin-de-siecle awareness of the physical
environment was precipitated by two events: (1) an unexpected
depletion of non-renewable natural resources, and (2) an accelerated
rate of pollution of renewable common goods (mainly water and air).
There had always been temporary and local shortages of lumber and
minerals before. But as Americans pressed westward, the newly
opened frontier had inevitably supplied the land, forests and raw
materials needed to fuel territorial expansion and industrial growth.
So too there had been isolated incidents of air and water pollution
throughout nineteenth century I. But neither social nor legal pressure
had been brought to bear on factories which dumped their refuse
into the environment; most Americans believed the material benefits
from more rapid industrialization were worth the community costs
of smoke damage and dead fish. Moreover, blind faith in the market
mechanism deterred imposition of extra-market controls on profitseeking, goods-producing entrepreneurs.
By the turn of the century changes in America's social and economic condition forced closer attention to the social costs of reckless, unregulated natural resource use. First, the frontier had finally
been pushed to the Pacific Ocean. With its disappearance had ended
the nineteenth century I assumption of inexhaustible natural resources. There were limits to the amount of ore, lumber and fuel that
could be extracted from a finite land area, and Americans in twentieth century I could no longer ignore the frightening consequences
this fact held for a people accustomed to ruthless resource exploitation.
Second, due in part to some of the worst decades of agricultural
depression in our nation's history and in part to an unparalleled wave
of immigration from Europe, there had been a sudden convergence
of people upon America's cities. Water supply and sewage disposal
lagged far behind the needs of mushrooming city populations. Contamination of water supplies by sewage accounted in large measure
for the wretched public health records of the period. Coal-burning
furnaces fouled the air with soot and cinders, contributing to the
general malaise of city slums.
Labor, and Public Policy, 1860-1897 (1961); S. Hays, The Response to Industrialism:
1855-1914 (1957).
For studies on more specific topics, see A. Schlesinger, The Rise of the City, 1878-1898
(1933) (urbanization); R. Hofstadter, The Age of Reform: From Bryan to F.D.R. (1955)
(politics); F. Shannon, The Farmer's Last Frontier, 1860-1897 (1945) (agriculture); Conditions of Freedom, supra note 1 (law).
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Such unprecedented urban growth also meant that the labor shortage that had persisted since colonial times no longer existed. Lured
by this vast reservoir of labor, as well as by the vision of untapped
markets present in large urban populations, more and more industry
located in the midst of crowded city settings. Urban expansion of the
factory system in the 1880's and 1890's in turn caused a degree of
air and water pollution that would have seemed improbable fifty
years earlier. Nor were there economic incentives to reduce the
amount of pollution produced. The manufacturer, with all his capital
tied up in new machinery, was driven to seek a rapid return on his
products, generally at low prices in a highly competitive market.
What better way was there for the hard-pressed industrialist to
reduce overhead costs than by using the physical environment as a
free and convenient receptacle for his factory's wastes? No matter
that such economies were at the expense of diseconomies imposed
on the surrounding city. For, to much of private industry, the end
products of the manufacturing system certainly seemed to justify the
resultant pollution nuisance. 0
10. The costs of pollution are traditionally attributable to at least three kinds of institutional influences-economic, social, and legal.
Economic causes. Because the present value of future goods and income is usually lower
than the anticipated future value, individuals tend to satisfy immediate demands without
taking into account the fact that the resource may have to be foregone in the future. This is
especially true for self-renewable goods (such as air) in a marketplace of fluctuating prices.
Moved by desire to maximize income upon an initial investment and pressed by competitive
struggle, entrepreneurs tend to employ resource-exhausive methods of production to cut
out-of-pocket costs. This emphasis on short-term profit also has the consequence of discouraging scientific resarch into pollution control. Since such research is not expected to
generate income for the entrepreneur, it is unlikely to be given much attention. See K.
Kapp, The Social Cost of Private Enterprise 94 (1950).
The incidence of pollution costs is likewise the result of limitations of the market
mechanism. In the traditional market system prices balance off demand and supply pressures. But since the pricing system usually fails to put a charge on renewable resources, the
resource factor is underpriced. When the selling price does not reflect the full cost to society
of all inputs, more of the resource is used in production than if only the price of the
resource factor properly reflected alternative uses to which it might be put. The end result is
that the economy pays the subsidy to those activities tha put above average pressure on free
resources. See Goldman, Why Do Polluters Pollute?, in Controlling Pollution: The Economics of a Cleaner America 12-13 (M. Goldman ed. 1967).
Social causea When people create an ordered society, certain patterns of behavior emerge
which tend to deplete resources and pollute the environment. Take the phenomenon of
"free riding." When a given service is provided for all citizens, such that the benefit received
by one does not diminish the benefit available to others, it is known as a collective or
common good. But since no individual can be excluded from the benefit even if he fails to
share the cost (as is true when individuals receive the advantages of free air), there is no
incentive for the individual to pay the price for the service. As no remedial action will take
place without its price being paid, the service will be foregone. The free-rider principle in
part explains why there has never been a groundswell of privately-initiated pollution abatement actions. See Goetz, Public v. Private Goods, in Economics of Air and Water Pollution
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By the end of the 1880's the fouling of air and water by unchecked industrial expansion and densely packed urban populations

had reached such proportions that policy makers at last began to
acknowledge the existence of social costs.1

There was no other

alternative. Market forces alone were insufficient to make the
individual who wished to use the environment as a waste disposal
medium consider or bear the costs his action imposed on others. If
responsibility was going to be taken for abating diffused external

costs, it was not going to come from private individuals bent on
maximizing their own welfare. Remedial action, if it was to come at
all, would have to come from the public sector-from laws and the
legal process.
THE LEGAL RESPONSE TO AIR POLLUTION: LAW'S
IMPACT ON PRIVATE BEHAVIOR

Just as various social and economic pressures have always exerted
an influence on the development of law, so too does law, once
enacted, affect private decisions and social experience. Although it is
difficult to measure the extent to which people gather information
22-28 (W. Walker ed. 1969); Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 Science 1243
(1968).
Legal causes. When the United States was a debtor nation with a shortage of labor and
dependent upon foreign investments and overseas trade, laws responded to these facts of
scarcity by furthering exploitation of natural resources. Later, when a common desire to
foster industry in twentieth century I placed a premium on the free disposal of wastes into
the environment, law reflected and encouraged this trend. With little social and economic
pressure pointed in the direction of resource conservation, remedial laws which had the
effect of diminishing profits by imposing anti-pollution costs on pollution producers were
usually watered down. See F. Murphy, Water Purity: A Study in Legal Control of Natural
Resources 50 (1961); J. Hurst Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the
Lumber Industry in Wisconsin 1836-1915, at 262-63 (1964).
Not only were there deficiencies in the way law was used in the nineteenth century
vis-h-vis the pollution problem. There were (and still are) institutional limitations on existing
legal agencies that made these bodies ill suited to the needs of environmental management.
The judiciary found itself confronting structural limits when it attempted to resolve polycentric pollution problems rather than adjudicate narrowly defined controversies. The legislature functioned best as a political assessment body and worst as a technological assessment
body; it generally fully comprehended the benefits which ensued from a resource exhausive
policy, while it understated the potential risks and costs. Even the basic structural units of
an organized society, such as states, counties and cities, found their basic governmental
powers insufficient to control the peculiarly mobile and diffuse problems of inter-jurisdictional pollution. See generally Hines, Nor Any Drop to Drink: Public Regulation of Water
Quality, Part I: State Pollution Control Programs 52 Iowa L. Rev. 186, 199-201 (1966); J.
Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers 19 (1950); Zimmerman, Political
BoundariesandAir Pollution Control, 46 Urban L. 173 (1968).
11. Social costs are direct or indirect losses to the community which result from private
activities, but for which private parties are not held accountable. Air pollution is a good
example of a social cost. It produces harmful effects on one or more persons, and originates
in the actions of other people or firms who have no transactional relation with most of
those injured.
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about law, evaluate it, calculate and assess its impact, and then
decide on a course of action, it seems certain that at some point most
people take account of legal rules in their activities.' 2
Up until 1880 law entered the decisional calculus primarily because men saw in the legal process a means by which to order society
and provide a framework for economic growth. Law existed to serve
focused resource allocative purposes which emerged out of private
experience in a substantially unregulated market context. The common law of contract, property and tort helped entrepreneurs realize
economic expectations by allowing them to conduct their affairs in
light of a legally protected standard of behavior. Legislation creating
high protective tariffs, tax-supported municipal credits, and franchise
grants to private operators were not only legal guarantees of broad
areas for economic maneuver; they were also examples of law's usefulness as an instrument for removing barriers to individual initiative.
But by 1880 and the beginning of twentieth century I, unprecedented economic and social dysfunctions forced men gradually to
move away from reliance on this law-supported market. The need for
affirmative rather than supportive legal intervention in the affairs of
men was now apparent. The situation could not take care of itself,
and law, adapting to new conditions, was the primary instrument for
focusing volition and bringing it to action in new directions. This
resort to law was consistent with the American tradition of bringing
economic and social trends to peaceful adjustment through politics
and the legal process. In accordance with Calhoun's principle of
meeting "power with power, tendency with tendency," law sought
to re-establish a balance of power in collective action.' 3
Law's assumption of new responsibilities in shaping man's social
environment was made easier because such legal action was built on
the power already conceded to the legal order to promote the economy. Much of the post-1880 use of law was also contingent upon the
12. Sometimes people decide not to calculate the impact of legal rules because the cost
of making the decision is greater than the benefit expected. Sometimes they are not only
guided by extra-legal factors. Sometimes people do not make rational calculations at all and
decide on the basis of a hunch or guess. But because of law's possession of the only
legitimate monopoly of force within a community, the impact of law on any given decision
necessarily becomes at least one factor that is typically considered. See J. Hurst, Law and
Social Process in United States History 267-74 (1960).
13. Law's post-1880 push for action in new directions was partially the result of intervention of an affected community in the affairs of men who employed power. It was also an
example of the long-held notion that organized power over men's will should be accountable
to serve ends of broader concern than the purposes of the power holders. Cf. Chief Justice
Taney's dicta in Charles River Bridge v. Warren Bridge, 36 U.S. 419, 11 Pet. 420 (1837):
"While the rights of private property are sacredly guarded, we must not forget that the
community also have rights ......
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now-established legitimacy of the police power to adjust patterns of
relationships at given points of time. Armed with this tradition, lawmakers began to turn their attention from the current operating costs
of social living and concern themselves instead with the overhead
costs of social existence. It was government's legitimate right to set
floors and ceilings for socially acceptable activity. Law, which had
previously been used to help private economic growth, was now
called upon to regulate it."
More important to the twentieth century environmental defender
was the fact that twentieth century I marked the first time law was
extensively used to take account of other-than-monetary gains and
costs. Eminent domain statutes promoted broadly diffused public
interest values. Legislation limiting employer's defenses reflected the
conclusion that it was not only unfair but inefficient to make injured
individuals bear losses causally related to the new scale of economic
operations. Health boards tested rivers and water supplies and contributed to the conservation of human resources. All this law-making
emphasis on social cost accounting had an impact. Men now had to
calculate the political-legal, rather than merely the market, effect on
their decisions.
Law was equally responsive to the widely spread costs of air pollution. There was no other choice. To do nothing legally when factories dumped poisonous wastes into the atmosphere was in effect
officially to sanction the resultant damage to life and property. Now,
in twentieth century I, tacit acknowledgment of this fact resulted in
new demands on the legal system. Law, not the market, was seen as
the prime tool with which the air pollution problem might be corrected. And it was not long before the two most powerful pre-1880
legal institutions, the judiciary and the legislature, were called upon
to address this new concern.
Due to the natural proclivity of injured parties to seek immediate
relief through litigation, the courts were first to respond to twentieth
century I air pollution. Unlike the situation in nineteenth century I,
many of the reported court decisions of this post-1880 period
favored the interests of plaintiffs over those of polluters. Of the cases
14. By the end of the twentieth century, it had been well established that certain key
areas, such as public utilities, were subject to regulation by the states. It was also recognized
that certain organizational products of the market, such as trusts and monopolies, could be
regulated by the federal government. See generally L. Friedman, A History of American
Law 384-408 (1973).
Ironically, there were some unforseen economic consequences of public regulatory law.
For example, sanitary regulations required greater capital investment by farmers and dairy
interests. This, in turn, affected the margin of survival in the agricultural industry and
encouraged trends toward concentration and the rise of cooperatives.
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that eventually reached the appellate level, many not only reflected a
belief that unchecked industrial growth was a prime reason for the
pollution problem; they also displayed an unprecedented judicial

willingness to use law as a means of slowing the economic expansion
that had caused polluted air.' s

Other cases demonstrated a remarkably prescient grasp of the
law's potential for internalizing the diffuse, external, non-monetary
costs of economic activities, and conditioning the grant of a legal
privilege on the fulfillment of certain legal duties. Cost internaliza-

tion goals were implicit in Price v. Philip Carey ManufacturingCo. 16
To avoid the costs of an injunction the Price court required an industrial plant to spend $10,000 on a smoke prevention device. Similarly,
in Appeal of the Pennsylvania Lead Co., 1

an 1880 court fore-

shadowed eventual protection of non-measurable aesthetic interests
in twentieth century II when it justified its injunction against an air
polluter because: "Where justice is properly 1 administered, rights are
never measured by their mere money value." 8
Another 1880's case, Tuebner v. California Street Railroad Co., 9
recognized the failure of prior legal institutions to make clear that
15. See, Sullivan v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co., 208 Pa. 540, 57A. 1065 (1904). In
Sullivan, the court granted an injunction that stopped a polluting industry from expanding
its operations. This would have been an unheard of course of action in nineteenth century I.
16. 310 Pa. 556, 165 A 849, 42 Am. Rep. 534 (1933).
17. 96 Pa. 116 (1880).
18. Id. at 539. The Pennsylvania Lead court not only foreshadowed twentieth century
legal interest in conserving other-than-monetized environmental values. Its decision was also
based on the following quotation from "Wood on Nuisances" that refuted nearly all the
excuses an( defenses that were to be repeatedly raised by polluters in the 1960s:
A person cannot go on and build extensive works and make heavy expenditures of money for the exercise of a trade or business that will invade the
premises of another with smoke . . . and then when called upon to desist turn
around and claim immunity for his trade or business on the ground that to
stop it would involve him in ruin, and that he has adopted the most approved
methods known to science ...nor that his trade is a useful one and beneficial
to the community ...or that by bringing a large number of workmen into the
community it has enhanced the value of plaintiff's property.
Unlike the Pennsylvania Lead court, many twentieth century courts still hesitate to grant
injunctive relief to aggrieved plaintiffs when such a decree would result in closing defendant's economic operations. See Boomer v. Atlantic Cement Co., 26 N.Y.2d 219, 257
N.E.2d 870, 809 N.Y.S. 2d 312 (1970); Riter v. Keokuk Electro-Metals Co., 248 Iowa 710,
82 N.W.2d 151 (1957). Much twentieth century state legislation likewise reflects reluctance
to punish polluters when it is economically or technologically unfeasible to install antipollution devices. See, Colo. Rev. Stat. Ann. § 25-7-115(1)(a)(b)(1973), which requires the
Colorado Air Pollution Variance Board to suspend enforcement of any emission control
regulation whenever "control techniques are not available or ...compliance with applicable
emission control regulations ... would create an unreasonable economic burden." See also
Laitos, The Limits of the Law: FunctionalFailuresof the Air Pollution Variance Board, 44
Colo. L. Rev. 513 (1973).
19. 66 Cal. 171, 4 P 1162 (1884).
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some legal privileges advanced certain values only by undermining
others. Tuebner overruled decisions which had held that the grant of
a steam car franchise prevented property owners along the line from
suing franchise owners for smoke injury. The court reasoned that a
better rule was one which qualified the franchise by awarding
damages to injured plaintiffs. As the court put the issue: "The
municipality could grant a franchise for running cars along the street,
but it could not grant a franchise to materially injure the plaintiffs in
their property rights."'2
Interest in the deteriorating state of man's physical environment
was not just reflected in the focused expressions of judge-made common law. A broader concern about natural resource waste can be
found in various post-1880 statutes. For most of the nineteenth
century the prevailing legislative attitude had run to the opposite
result. Tariffs, taxes and periodic sales of public land had helped
shape an economic environment of multi-state markets; legislativemade law had encouraged industry, fostered credit facilities and
promoted the allocation of human resources across a vast continent.
But the raw materials of economic growth were not inexhaustible,
and with rapid settlement and productive expansion came premature
depletion of energy sources, contamination of water supplies,
destruction of wildlife, erosion of soil and pollution of air. At nearly
every level of government-national, state, and municipal-a new consensus developed which recognized that exhaustion and pollution of
the natural endowment was not impossible. By the 1880s, acknowledgment of the existence of the problem had finally led to acceptance of a public responsibility to do something about it. Recourse
to the courts was limited by the narrow constitutional strictures of
case and controversy. Broad-reaching, prospective policy-making had
to come from the legislative branch.
In the case of air pollution the first legislative bodies to take
affirmative action were the common councils of large industrial
municipalities. It is not surprising that it was the city, and not the
state or federal government, which first responded to air pollution.
People saw dirty air as a local problem, not a regional or national
concern. True, Congress enacted the Rivers and Harbors Act of 1899,
making it unlawful to deposit refuse in navigable waters;2 1 but the
problem of depositing refuse in the air was left to the cities, where
most of this atmospheric dumping took place. State legislatures re20. Id.
21. 33 U.S.C. § § 407 et seq. For a 1970's application of the Rivers and Harbor Act, see
Conn. Action Now, Inc. v. Roberts Plating Co., Inc., 457 F.2d 81 (2d Cir. 1972).
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flected this belief that local problems were best dealt with by local
law. Where state legislatures acted at all, it was only by granting first
class cities the power to regulate smoke nuisances. 2 2
Municipal government, on the other hand, was quite responsive to
what was, in fact, largely a big city phenomenon. The city boss and
his lieutenants in the wards and precincts were the first to hear many
loud complaints about the poor quality of the air. Aldermen seeking
re-election could not ignore the fact that the city's atmosphere was
unable to assimilate the tons of waste and soot that were being
expelled from industry and dwelling units every day. Usually proceeding under broad charter grants of police power, city councils
hurriedly drafted and passed regulatory ordinances.
Air pollution ordinances enacted by these late nineteenth century
metropolitan common councils typically fell into three categories.
Most common were the ordinances which simply declared (1) that
the emission of dense smoke from any chimney or smokestack
within the city was a public nuisance, and (2) that those who caused
the emission of this smoke were liable to a fine, usually not exceeding $100.2 3 A second type of ordinance did not merely declare the
escape of dense smoke illegal; these more sophisticated laws placed
an affirmative duty on polluters, requiring them not only to remove
all ashes and cinders from their shops, but also to construct their
furnaces "so as to consume smoke arising therefrom." 2 ' The third
kind of ordinance struck at the apparent cause of the city's smoke
problem-extensive use of soft, high sulphur, bituminous coal. These
ordinances flatly prohibited the importation, sale, use or consumption of any coal containing more than 12 percent ash or 2 percent
sulphur.2 s
All three categories of ordinances had common characteristics.
22. See No. 130 [18901, Ohio Laws 166, supra note 4. Some state legislation went
further and prohibited the use of highly polluting "soft" coal. See Law of Apr. 16, 1895,
ch. 322, Laws of New York (1895).
23. See, Detroit, Mich., Rev. Ordinances, ch. 37: "Any owner ...who shall cause smoke
to be emitted from such structure ... shall be liable to a fine of not less than $10 or more
than $100." See also New York Sanitary Code, § 181 (cited in People v. New York Edison,
159 App. Div. 786, 144 N.Y.S. 707 (1913)); Chicago Ordinances § 10 1903 (cited in
Glucose Refining Co. v. Chicago, 138 Fed. 209 C.C.N.D., Ill.
1905).
24. See, section 134 of N.Y. City Sanitary Code (1899). The ordinance read in part:
Owners, lessees ....of every blacksmith or other shop ... shall cause all ashes,
cinders, rubbish, dirt, and refuse to be removed to some proper place.... Nor
shall any owner ... allow any smoke.., to escape ...from any such building
...and every furnace employed in the working of engines... or used for the
purposes of trade or manufacturing, shall be so constructed as to consume
smoke arising therefrom.
25. See, St. Louis Mo. Ordinances 41804, sec. 5340 (cited in Ballentine v. Nester, 350
Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942)).
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Perhaps most noticeable was the fact that none of them had as an
objective the achievement of a fixed level of over-all air quality. The
attainment of a certain minimum of atmospheric purity was the
approach later adopted by states and the federal government in
twentieth century 11.26 But to the nineteenth century common
council, the apparent essence of the problem seemed to be manifested in isolated instances of dense smoke escaping from smokestacks and the equally obvious goal was to stop the smoke. Another
distinctive feature of most of these ordinances was their lack of
provision for an enforcement mechanism. Although the ordinance
typically declared that the emission of thick dense smoke was a
public nuisance, no public official was empowered either to locate or
abate these nuisances.
But perhaps the greatest weakness with these laws was that they
were nearly always worded solely in terms of a simple "dense
smoke" prohibition. The popularity of the phrase was in part because many state courts had held that "dense smoke" was a nuisance
per se.' 7 By writing the talisman phrase into their ordinances many
common councils apparently hoped that the courts would arrive at
the same conclusion. Unfortunately, whatever advantage there was'in
having dense smoke recognized as a nuisance per se was outweighed
by the fact that such a narrowly focused prohibition ignored the
more harmful invisible pollutants present in the smoke. Moreover,
satisfaction with the phrase was so longlasting that for many years
lawmakers and administrators failed to investigate whether more
than just smoke affected the ambient air and made no effort to
define more precisely the acceptable and unacceptable density limits
of smoke plumes.2 8
Despite these shortcomings (or perhaps because of them), most
twentieth century I smoke control ordinances and statutes success26. Most modem environmental protection agencies first establish air quality standards
consistent with environmental goals and then enforce these standards by regulating or
prosecuting polluters who violate them. See Message of the President Relative to Reorganization Plans No. 3 of 1970 relating to the functions of the Environmental Protection
Agency, H.R. Doc. No. 366, 91st Cong., 2d Sess. (1970). See also Ill. Ann. Stat. ch. 111.5
§ 1004 (West 1970); N.Y. Environmental Conservation Law Art. 11-71 (McKinney 1970).
27. See People v. New York Edison, 159 App. Div. 786, 144 N.Y.S. 707 (1913).
28. By the twentieth century, many smoke nuisance ordinances specified the density and
opacity limits of smoke emissions by making reference to the Ringlemann Scale. See
Rochester N.Y. Ordinances, § 39 (a) (cited in City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling
Co., 199 N.Y. 207, 92 N.E. 641 (1910)).
The Ringlemann scale showed six blocks of graduated gray going from near white to near
black; most laws specified that any shade of smoke darker than a third block on the scale
was a violation. Unfortunately, the Ringlemann method measured only density, not volume.
Nor could it be used at night, during times of rain, humidity, or high winds.
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fully withstood constitutional attacks on their validity."
As one
court stated in upholding the Chicago smoke ordinance of 1903:
It seems clear that all regulations of the uses of property should be
created with a reasonable reference to the necessary demands of
trade or manufacturing. . . . But, while it is difficult to adjust the

exact rights of business interests and public good, once adjusted,
30
society has power to assert itself for the protection of itself.
By 1916 the issue had come before the United States Supreme
Court. In Northwestern Laundry v. Des Moines, 3
the Court removed the last doubts about the constitutional ability of states and
cities to regulate the air pollution nuisance.
So far as the Federal Constitution is concerned, we have no doubt
the state may by itself, or through authorized municipalities, declare
the emission of dense smoke ... a nuisance ... and that the harsh-

ness of such legislation, or its effect on business interests, short of a
merely arbitrary enactment, are not valid constitutional objections. 32
All this constitutional, common law and legislative lawmaking in
the pollution field should have had an effect on polluter behavior
and the quality of the surrounding atmosphere. Because of some
fundamental limitations in the American legal process, however,
pollution control law in fact had very little impact either on men's
decisional calculus or the pre-1930 ambient air.
29. Ordinances were upheld in People v. Lewis, 86 Mich. 49 N.W. 140 (1891); Dept. of
Health of N.Y. City v. Ebling Brewing, 78 N.Y.S. 11 (Mun. Ct. 1902); Ballentine v. Nester,
350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942). Enabling statutes (granting legislative permission to
enact smoke ordinances such as the above) were upheld in City of Cincinatti v. Miller, 11
Ohio Dec. Reprint 788, 29 W.L. Bull. 364 (1893); City of Brooklyn v. Nassau Electric R.
Co., 44 App. Div. 462, 61 N.Y.S. 33 (1899).
30. Glucose Refining Co. v. Chicago, 138 Fed. 209 (C.C., Ill. 1905).
31. 239 U.S. 486 (1916).
32. Id. at 491. The Supreme Court decision in Northwestern Laundry was not unexpected. In 1894 the Court had held that a statute or ordinance regulating nuisances did not
violate the due process clause if it was reasonbly necessary for the accomplishment of the
purposes of the law, was not unduly oppressive and did not arbitrarily interfere with private
business. Lawton v. Steele, 152 U.S. 133 (1894). In Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394
(1915), the Court had found that it was within the police powers of Los Angeles to pass and
enforce an ordinance which made it unlawful to operate a brick-burning factory within the
city limits. Also in 1915, in an original proceeding initiated by the state of Georgia to
restrain the Tennessee Copper Company in Tennessee, the Court allowed an injunction
which prohibited smoke discharge from the Tennessee plant. State of Georgia v. Tennessee
Copper Co., 240 U.S. 650 (1916).
The United States Supreme Court affirmed the rationale of the Northwestern Laundry
case more recently in Huron Portland Cement v. City of Detroit, 362 U.S. 440 (1960).
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LIMITATIONS OF THE AMERICAN LEGAL SYSTEM: LAW'S
LACK OF IMPACT ON DECISION-MAKING

Despite the efforts of city councils, state legislatures and courts,
the post-1880 air pollution problem grew rather than diminished.

Pollution sources increased and air quality deteriorated. 3 ' By the
1950's contaminated air was so extensive that lawmakers tried
totally new legal approaches. County air pollution agencies replaced
city smoke inspectors. A growing assertion of authority by the federal government produced the first national Air Pollution Control
Act of 1955; the Department of Health, Education and Welfare de-

veloped air quality criteria that reflected scientific awareness of
various non-visible pollutants; the concept of regional airsheds was
proposed and adopted for the first time.3 4
There were two primary reasons for the lack of legal impact on

pollution problems in twentieth century I. Both of these still function as restrictions on effective legal regulation of environmental
pollution in the 1970's. (1) Limitations inherent in the nature of the
legal process prevented law from affecting natural resource use decisions even when law specifically addressed the pollution problem. (2)
The absence of continuous deliberated decision and periodic re-assessment of ongoing law produced drift in policy and default to the

market.
A. PracticalLimitations on the Use of Legal Power
It would be heartening if rising levels of air pollution could be
explained by a lack of law. One could then arguably conclude that
pollution might be prevented simply by using more law. 3 I Unfortu33. It is difficult to determine precisely the extent to which the quality of the air
deteriorated, since no measurements of pollutants were made or recorded in twentieth
century I. The most we know for certain is that the 1880-1930 period witnessed an enormous expansion of the most common air pollution sources- factories, railroads, steamships,
automobiles, refuse-burning dumps, and coal-fired home furnaces. Nevertheless, a rough
estimate of the degree of air pollution perceived during this period can be obtained by
noting concern over the issue voiced in various pre-1930 publications. See, Milwaukee Free
Press, June 27, 1907 at 15; Chicago Record Herald, June 28, 1907 at p. 4; The Madison
Capital Times, Apr. 3, 1923 at 43.
34. See Milwaukee County Ordinances, ch. 88 (1948); The Air Pollution Control Act of
1955, Pub. L. No. 85-159, 69 Stat. 322 (1955); The Clean Air Act of 1963, Pub. L. No.
88-206, 77 Stat. 392 (1963) (codified at 42 U.S.C. § § 1857-1857(1) (1964)); Reitz, The
Role of the "Region" in Air Pollution Control, 20 Case W. Res. L. Rev. 809 (1969).
Despite these efforts to control air pollution from 1955-1965, the dangerous contamination of the air continued. In part this was because only 58 percent of the urban population
was served by some local pollution control program. Comment, A History of Federal Air
Pollution Control, 30 Ohio St. L.J. 516, 529 (1969).
35. Now that interest in environmental law has swollen the ranks of law school activists,
the most common approach to the pollution problem is to call for increased legal intervention. See J. Sax, Defending the Environment (1970); Note, Toward a Constitutionally
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nately, review of the pre-1930 record suggests that it would be
unproductive merely to exhort lawmakers. For the fact is that law
was continuously called upon to regulate the pollution nuisance. It
was in spite of law that men used the air as a garbage dump. There
were three reasons for this ineffectual legal impact on polluter behavior: (1) there were limits on what law could accomplish without
extra-legal assistance; (2) lawmakers tended to address pollution's
symptoms, not the underlying causes; and (3) legal institutions were
underdeveloped.
1. The limits of law alone
The capacity of law to induce changes is sharply reduced whenever
a legal solution to a problem requires extra-legal knowledge. Policy
implementation is particularly difficult where scientific and technical
knowledge is at a premium; when this information is missing, policymakers are prevented from considering all the relevant values in their
decisions. Moreover, the legal process is often unable to muster
general will to action on the basis of such limited knowledge. And if
lack of probative data can be raised as a successful defense by the
regulated class, then the impact of any legal rule is apt to be so small
that the rule can be safely ignored.
Such was (and is) the case with the air pollution problem. Both
the nature of the problem and its abatement linked it especially
closely to scientific and economic factors over which lawmakers had
no control and of which they had little knowledge. Worse, law
possessed inadequate procedures with which to acquire this information.
Varying states of scientific and technical knowledge affected protection of interests through the common law. Most court cases
involving air pollution were nuisance actions where aggrieved private
parties requested an injunction. In such instances the flexible powers
of an equity court combined with the required determination of
"reasonableness" to develop a judicial policy of balancing the harm
to the plaintiff against any usefulness of the defendant's conduct. 6
Protected Environment, 56 U. of Va. L. Rev. 458 (1970); Comment, The Role of the
Judiciary in the Confrontation with the Problems of Environmental Quality, 17 U.C.L.A. L.
Rev. 1070 (1970); Juergensmeyer, Control of Air Pollution Through the Assertion of Private Rights, 1967 Duke L.J. 1126.
36. As explained in the early air pollution case of Cogswell v. New York, New Haven,
and Hartford R.R., 103 N.Y. 10, 13, 8 N.E. 537 (1886):
The compromise exacted by the necessities of the social state, and the fact
that some inconvenience to others must of necessity often attend the ordinary
use of property . . . have compelled the recognition ... that each member of
society must submit to annoyances consequent upon the ordinary and
common use of property, provided such use is reasonable ....
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When the difficulties of proving a causal connection between harm

and effluent were balanced against the usual economic importance of
an accused factory, the plaintiff's obstacles were obvious. As one
1894 court said in refusing to enjoin the operation of a dairy,
"... there is no presumption that such results [production of offend-

ing gases] come from the use of dairies. "17 So too, lack of effective
smoke control equipment was usually sufficient justification to fore-

close judicial relief and to leave undisturbed the bad practices of
economic enterprise. 3 8 Even with the sophisticated twentieth century II air samplers and recent technology offering a new generation
of pollution control devices, problems of proof and uncontrollable
emission sources still remain in the 1970's. 3 9
The existence or absence of extra-legal knowledge played a large

role whenever courts reviewed the validity of municipal smoke ordinances. Difficulties in linking health or property damage to air pollution initially defeated judicial enforcement of early city smoke control laws. 4 Sometimes courts were able to uphold ordinances by

relying on "judicial notice" of the cause of damage.4

But courts

could also take judicial notice of such extra-legal facts as might show
that smoke control ordinances were unreasonable. For example, in
City of Buffalo v. New York CentralR. Co., judicial notice of the

"immense amount of money needed to finance the operations commanded by the ordinance" provided the basis on which the court
37. McDonough v. Robbens, 1 Mo. App. Rep'r 78, 60 Mo. App. 156 (1864). The wide
judicial discretion exercised in private nuisance cases was manifested in one court classifying
the pollution from fifty coke ovens as only a "petty annoyance." The same court then
concluded that air pollution was "indispensable to progress." Bove v. Donner-Hanna Coke
Corp., 236 App. Div. 37, 258 N.Y.S. 229 (1932) aff'g 142 Misc. 329, 254 N.Y.S. 403
(1931). Twenty years later the City of Buffalo was still having difficulty with the same
factory. See City of Buffalo v. Savage, 1 Misc.2d 337, 148 N.Y.S. 2d 191, aff'd mem., 309
N.Y. 941, 132 N.E.2d 313 (1955).
38. See Union Planter's Bank and Trust Co. v. Memphis Hotel Co., 124 Tenn. 649, 139
S.W. 715 (1911). In the Union Planter'sBank decision, the court refused to enjoin emission
of smoke from a hotel chimney because of "doubt as to whether there is any device which
could be attached to... defendants' boilers which would... do away with the smoke .. "
39. See generally Krier, Environmental Litigation and the Burden of Proof, in Law and
the Environment 105 (M. Baldwin & J. Page eds. 1970); Miller & Borchers, Private Lawsuits
and Air Pollution Control, 56 A.B.A.J. 465 (1970); McElheny, Environmental Agency is
Divided Over Car-Pollution Control Issue, N.Y. Times, Oct. 15, 1973 at 40, col. 1; The
Madison Capital Times, July 11, 1973 at 6.
40. See, e.g., Dept. of Health v. City of New York v. Ebling Brewing Co., 38 Misc. 537,
78 N.Y.S. 13 (N.Y. City Mun. Ct. 1902). The Ebling court struck down section 134 of the
1899 New York City Sanitary Code because defendant could not be penalized for allowing
smoke to escape where it was not shown it was detrimental or annoying to any person.
41. City of Rochester v. Macauley-Fien Milling Co., 199 N.Y. 207, 92 N.E. 641, (1910);
State v. Tower, 185 Mo. 79, 84 S.W. 10 (1904); Bowers v. City of Indianapolis, 169 Ind.
105, 81 N.E. 1097 (1907).
42. 125 Misc. 801, 212 N.Y.S. 1 (Sup. Ct. 1925).
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held the Buffalo smoke law invalid. In People v. Detroit,B.I., and W.
Ferry Co.,4 the court's belief that "no device has been invented
that is adequate for the elimination of smoke" helped it strike down
the Detroit smoke control ordinance. The effect of these court rulings was not lost on state legislators. By 1900 it was not uncommon
for enabling statutes to contain a proviso excepting polluters from
the requirements of city smoke ordinances when no control equipment was available. 4 4
On the other hand, when the validity of smoke prevention ordinances was sustained, the courts would sometimes admit that certain
crucial facts were outside their knowledge. One of the nation's first
smoke control ordinances, the Chicago ordinance of 1880,4s was
upheld primarily because the court conceded "we cannot know ...
the consequences that may flow from ...allowing the common
council to place an embargo on all the interests that have to use this
[smoke-producing] coal." '4 6 Other courts skirted the lack-of-knowledge issue by glibly invoking the principle that legislative bodies are
presumed to have considered the effect, practicality and expense of
the new law." 7 Such judicial decisions did more than allocate the
risks and burdens of ignorance. They also obscured the fact that
legislative bodies had neither the expertise nor inclination to make
intelligent investigation of the worsening air pollution problem before hurriedly enacting law. 4 8
43. 187 Mich. 177, 153 N.W. 799 (1915).
44. See, e.g., State v. Tower, 185 Mo. 79, 84 S.W. 10 (1904). In Tower, the Missouri
Supreme Court upheld the constitutionality of a 1901 Missouri dense smoke statute largely
on the basis that
(tI he legislature ...[wasl careful to abstain from even a semblance of oppression, and an invasion of the property right of owners ... to maintain engines
and boilers for the manufacture of wares and merchandise, by providing that,
if there were no known practicable devices by which dense smoke so generated
could be prevented, they should not be punished therefor.
45. Chicago, Ill., Gen. Ordinances, § § 1650, 1651 (1880).
46. Harmon v. City of Chicago, 110 111.
400 (1884).
47. See Moses v. U.S., 16 App. D.C. 428 (1900). Moses upheld the constitutionality of
Congressional legislation making the emission of dense smoke within the District of Columbia a public nuisance. Act of Feb. 2, 1899, ch. 79, 30 Stat. 812. The court stated:
That there may be no smoke consumption appliance that will prevent the
nuisance is not a matter of relevancy. . . . It is presumed that Congress considered the effect and probable injury upon private property.
See also Bradley v. District of Columbia, 20 App. D.C. 169 (1902), where the court again
concurred in the Moses rationale.
48. The problem of supporting clean-air laws with more precise scientific information is
still present in the 1970's. See McElheny, EPA Official Deplores Lack of Research to
Support U.S. Clean-Air Legislation, N.Y. Times, Oct. 6, 1973 at 20, col. 3.
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2. Drug store law
There were two ways in which law's initial response to the natural
resource pollution problem was like that of an unskilled physician
prescribing a drug. First, most lawmakers (particularly those in the
legislative branch) opted for quick cures of symptoms rather than
addressing more fundamental causes. There was no thought of longterm therapy. The harm was focused and the causes seemed specific.
One could see what soot did to laundry and furniture, and everyone
knew which smokestacks emitted black smoke. The urban public
demanded immediate relief, and legislative lawmakers were quick to
respond. The medicine prescribed was remedial, not preventative.
Diffused costs were ignored. Statutes and ordinances attacked the
most visible and superficial manifestation of the problem, smoke, not
the underlying economic and market dysfunctions that caused the
smoke.
The readiness with which the nineteenth century turned to law
when there was a problem tended both to confuse the nature of the
problem and blunt the effectiveness of its legal cure. For example,
twentieth century I lawmakers commonly believed that air pollution
troubles were due to deviance from proper market patterns. Confidence in the market as a socially beneficial allocating institution led
to the belief that law needed only to deal strictly with market deviates. What was not considered was that the external costs of air
pollution were due precisely to the fact that the market was working
just as its functional character inclined it to work; that the smoke
nuisance was a typical product of the natural tendency of the market, rather than a correctable internal defect. 4 Nor did policymakers consider the more remote ramifications of their action;
whether the benefits realized by air quality improvements were
worth certain long-run costs (the costs of government intervention,
the value of opportunities foregone).
There was a second way in which the typical legislative response to
air pollution was like prescribing a drug. Prescribing drugs help some
physicians retain a sense of mastery in ambiguous situations. Once a
patient needs to get treatment, the physician needs to give it-or at
49. There was no way the market could withhold air from the polluter. Nor could the
market function to charge for the right to pollute or the right to breathe. Therefore, there
could be no prices paid or payments foregone by polluters that would convey to them
information about the social disutility of their conduct or give them an incentive to change
their ways. See J. Dales, Pollution, Property, and Prices (1968); Goldman, Pollution: The
Mess Around Us, in Controlling Pollution: The Economics of a Cleaner America 3 (M.
Goldman ed. 1967).
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least the appearance of it. The twentieth century I common council
and state legislature were caught in a similar dilemma. The public

expected not just relief, but some affirmative treatment. If no smoke
control laws had been passed, legal agencies would in effect have
been stating that there was nothing wrong with smoke. Worse, a
lawmaker-politician's refusal to give out laws would have seemed like
he was telling the public to suffer, even though he had the means to
relieve the pain.' o
Many smoke control ordinances passed after 1880 exemplify use
of law to secure quick remedies of only the most obvious symptoms
of the air pollution problem. On the one extreme were those ordinances premised on the belief that air pollution could be eliminated

More indicative of the
simply by prohibiting short smokestacks.'
drug store approach to problem-solving were unworkable ordinances
that were later struck down by the courts either because (1) they
required all businesses to operate without emitting any visible gas at
all (an accomplishment that is difficult to achieve even in 1975), s 2

or (2) they unreasonably prohibited manufacturers from carrying on
their business irrespective of its effect on the surrounding community.'5

Other smoke ordinances were held invalid because local

governments had enacted them without waiting for necessary state
enabling legislation.' ' Rather than promptly resorting to law, it
50. On the role of the lawmaker as a "political entrepreneur" whose laws function to
produce beneficial public goods, see Riker, Public Safety as a Public Good, in Is Law Dead?
370, 375 (E. Rostow ed. 1971).
51. See Neosho, Mo., Ordinances (1902). The Neosho law was a model of simplicity: "It
shall be unlawful . . . to allow [a] smokestack which is not 50 feet high so as to carry the
smoke high .. " This ordinance was upheld in State ex. rel. Hainsworth v. Shannon, 130
Mo. App. 90, 108 S.W. 1097 (St. Lluis Ct. App. 1908).
52. See Cleveland v. Maim, 5 Ohio N.P. 203 (1898). The Maim court invalidated the
Cleveland smoke ordinance because "[tihe legislature did not give the council power to
prohibit smoke under any and all circumstances and at any and all times." In Pittsburgh v.
W. H. Keech Co., 21 Pa. Super 548 (1902), the Pittsburgh smoke ordinance of 1895 was
declared void because "[the prohibition of any smoke whatever [is] impracticable and
impossible in present conditions." See also People v. Cunard White Star, 280 N.Y. 413, 21
N.E.2d 489 (1939), which found the New York City smoke ordinance invalid as applied as
exceeding police powers when ". . . even in the exercise of the greatest care [with-up-to-date
"
equipment] ... it would be impossible ... to avoid such smoke ..
53. See New York v. Rosenberg, 138 N.Y. 410, 34 N.E. 285 (1893). In Rosenberg,
judgment against the defendant was reversed because there was no evidence that the businesses covered by the statute (Laws of 1892, ch. 646, New York) injuriously affected the
community. See also City of St. Paul v. Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298, 31 N.W. 49 (1896). In
Gilfillan the St. Paul smoke ordinance of 1886 was declared void in part because the court
held that the emission of dense smoke was not necessarily a public nuisance.
54. See e.g., Sigler v. Cleveland, 3 Ohio N.P. 119, 4 Ohio Dec. 166 (1896); St. Paul v.
Gilfillan, 36 Minn. 298, 31 N.W. 49 (1886). In Pfister Chemical Co. v. Romano, 15 N.J.
Misc. 71, 188 A. 727 (1937), the smoke ordinance was invalid as not being within the
authority of the existing enabling statute. When legislatures conferred the requisite author-
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appears that decisionmakers should first have prudently assessed
both the problem and the limitations of the legal tools at their disposal.
3. The underdevelopment of legal institutions
Organizational limitations precluded effective response to resource
use problems as much as weaknesses in the substantive law. The task
of addressing post-1880 pollution problems fell upon legal agencies
that, weak in tradition and rushed by events, were ill-equipped to
meet them. Courts and legislatures shared the economic biases of the
community without developing means of expressing alternative viewpoints. When conflicts were brought to their attention, these institutions were too simple to develop complex techniques that would
place all the important considerations before the decision-maker.
The legislative branch was particularly vulnerable to one-sided
approaches to problem-solving. In both state legislatures and municipal common councils, legislative practice made it the rule that any
major piece of legislation be considered in consultation with the
main organized interests affected by the proposal. The practical
influence of major industrial polluters tended to limit pollution control legislation, especially when manufacturing interests were often
the main financial supporters of these elected officials. The accepted
idea of the intermittent, limited session had an equally adverse effect
on the quality of work done by the legislative branch. It contributed
to a lack of long-range policy planning. And since the authority of
standing committees ran only for the life of the session, their members lost what experience they might have gained had they been able
to conduct continuing investigations. The large turnover of membership also helped ensure that few legislators ever acquired expertise in
the environmental field.
The final legislative product usually reflected these structural restrictions. While enabling statutes and charters generally gave cities
the power to prevent dense smoke, no instructions were given as to
how this might be accomplished, when exceptions should be made,
or what was to be considered "dense." Nor was there any indication
that the legislature had considered whether there was more to improving air than merely preventing smoke." s Municipal common
ity on cities, the ordinance was usually upheld. See also City of St. Paul v. Haugbro, 93
Minn. 59, 100 N.W. 470 (1904).
55. Typical of the charters of this period was the Charter of the City of Minneapolis
(cited in State v. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co., 114 Minn. 122, 130 N.W. 545 (1911). The
Minneapolis charter read in part: "[The common council shall have the power to prevent]
... the emission of dense smoke in said city and to declare them to be nuisances and to
provide for their abatement."
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councils responded to these broad grants of authority by either
simply declaring soft coal or smoke to be a nuisance and leaving it at
that, or by passing unenforceable ordinances which required businesses to install impossible-to-build furnaces that didn't smoke.' 6
When the legal inducement to comply with the ordinance was only a
$10 fine, it is no wonder that these early smoke laws had so little
effect on municipal air polluters.' I
The judicial branch was institutionally unsuited to regulate the
pollution problem. While the total community impact of atmospheric pollution was serious, the effec on individuals was too slight
to make it worth their time or expense to protect the general welfare
by litigating their own complaints. Nor did courts have the investigative machinery, specialized knowledge, time or range of sanctions
necessary to regulate thousands of emission sources. Moreover, the
common law case-by-case, instance-by-instance method of building
law prevented judicial formulation of broad-reaching policy. Court
decisions were atomized; few generalizations emerged from particularized cases.
What was called for was the creation and use of autonomous,
centralized administrative agencies that specialized in issues of
natural resource use and pollution control. Unfortunately, although
states and the federal government set up administrative machinery to
assume more regulatory responsibility in some fields after 1870,
strong administrative control of environmental pollution did not
emerge until mid-twentieth century. Twentieth century I smoke
ordinances either ignored the use of administrative agencies altogether (leaving the enforcement of these ordinances somewhat of a
mystery), or placed pollution prevention functions in pre-existing
agencies (such as the Board of Health or Building Inspection Department) that were busy with other jobs.' 8 Besides lacking specialization in pollution control, these agencies had few fact-finding skills,
inadequate jurisdictional authority and no administrative corps or
field staff to enforce regulations.
Despite early underdevelopment of legal institutions, the twen56. See, e.g., Minneapolis, Minn., smoke ordinance, 1909 (cited in State v. Chicago, M.
and St. P. Ry. Co., 114 Minn. 122, 130 N.W. 545 (1911). See also New York, N.Y., Sanitary
Code § 134 (1899): "Every furnace employed in the working of engines ... used for the
purpose of trade or manufacturing, shall be so constructed as to consume smoke."
57. See Detroit, Mich. Rev. Ordinances, ch. 67 (1890). Occasionally the fine would be as
high as $50. See People v. Boden, 66 Mich. 273 (1891).
58. See, Rochester, N.Y., City Ordinances (1909) (cited in City of Rochester v.
Macauley-Fien Milling Co., 199 N.Y. 207, 92 N.E. 641 (1910)), which provided that it was
the duty of the Commissioner of Public Safety to enforce the ordinance.
A few cities did create a special office of smoke inspector. See Milwaukee, Wisc., Gen.
Ordinances, Ch. 21 (1905).
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tieth century finally brought legislative, judicial and administrative
changes more favorable to action against pollution. With its openended jurisdiction the legislature was sensitive to new currents of
popular concern. Increased use of the legislature's investigatory
power explored the need for better environmental legislation and
helped build informed public opinion. Local government reform
efforts abolished the office of the justice of the peace and replaced it
with a unified municipal court system. Larger cities created special
divisions of the Municipal Court-the misdemeanor and small claims
courts-that offered environmental litigants the advantages of a
simple and summary procedure. And of course, the phenomenal midtwentieth century growth of administrative power eventually provided continuous enforcement of pollution standards for people who
had too little means or too small a personal stake to fight their own
battles.' 9
B. Drift and Default
Practical limitations on the effective use of legal power were not
the only reasons for a lack of legal impact on the twentieth century I
pollution problem. Legal processes are not self-starting. Law was
unable to influence pollution prevention decisions when there was an
absence of continuing directed policy and when this neglect permitted environmental policy to be shaped by forces outside the law.
In the case of air pollution, there was a flurry of legal activity around
the turn of the century, and then passive acceptance of the existing
state of affairs for fifty years before any improvements were considered. This drift allowed ideas and attitudes originating outside the
law to create demands upon law that materially affected its use and
character. Public policy defaulted to the market again, just as it had
in nineteenth century I. Not only until 1930 did we turn to centralized administrative control and regulation as a means of fending off
the market's adverse effects.
1. Drift: appeasement and contentment
Public policy tends to succum to drift, ignorance and indifference
born of fragmented human effort and focused special interests. If a
problem becomes noticeable enough, informed opinion and public
pressure usually demand a legal response. But once this initial response has been made, unless large numbers of people experience the
problem with substantial, individualized impact, there is usually no
59. See generally J. Hurst, The Growth of American Law: The Law Makers 80, 154,
158-59 (1950).

NA TURA L RESOURCES JOURNAL

[Vol. 15

real effort to use law in order to gain control over the matter.
Mastery of a situation becomes too difficult. Problems are to be
addressed, but once addressed, can be forgotten.
Such was the story of the twentieth century I air pollution problem. A pall of smoke over America's cities generated enough complaints to force stirrings in the legal order. Statutes, ordinances and
court decisions provided first-generation pollution control instruments. But then law stood aside for half a century. There was little
administrative follow-through; there was no re-assessment of ongoing
policy. Rote imitation of past approaches seemed far preferrable to
imaginative schemes requiring research and study. And though rising
pollution levels, new pollution sources and an expanding array of
invisible pollutants called for novel policy departures mid-way
through twentieth century I, law makers were unable to see that
these new problems differed from old ones. Law responded to differing situations as if these situations could fall within old categories,
with attitudes developed in familiar areas from the past. 6 0
This drift in policy helped the twentieth century I decisionmaker
by offering him a comfortably limited range of responsibility. The
time, energy, information and human resources available to decisionmakers limit the number of possible solutions that can be considered.
But if problems are addressed in ways very similar to the way previous, related problems were approached, the decisionmaker can
escape the labor of thinking about the nature of the problem and its
ultimate cure. He may even be lulled into the belief that all possible
solutions have already been canvassed; that the current prevailing
wisdom is the best of all possible responses.
Lack of independent energy and investigation was particularly
evident in the pre-1930 legislative response to air pollution. Although
atmospheric quality steadily worsened, pollution control statutes and
ordinances continued to employ 1880 solutions.6 1 Rare court
60. See J. Hurst, Law and Economic Growth: The Legal History of the Lumber Industry
in Wisconsin, 1836-1915 108 (1964).
61. Legislative enactments controlling the use of high-polluting soft coal examplify the
tendency of lawmakers to imitate each other over a long span of time. In 1890, the Ohio
legislature gave all first class cities the power to regulate smoke emitted by coal burning.
Laws of 1890, § 1692a, Ohio Rev. Statutes. The state of New York followed suit in 1895
by prohibiting factories from using soft coal except for heating purposes. Laws of 1895, ch.
322, New York. Around the turn of the century Brooklyn passed an ordinance which
prevented the burning of soft coal within four miles of the"Brooklyn city hall (Brooklyn,
N.Y., Gen. Ordinances, p. 479, ch. 322, § 1 (1895), cited and upheld in City of New York
v. H. W. Johns-Manville Co., 89 App. Div. 449, 85 N.Y.S. 757 (1903)). By 1940, fifty years
after the original Ohio statute had been passed, St. Louis was still attempting to control air
pollution by means of a soft-coal prohibition (St. Louis, Mo., City Ordinance 41804,
§ 5340, cited in Ballentine v. Nester, 350 Mo. 58, 164 S.W.2d 378 (1942)). This mimicry
helped defer consideration of whether law should control other-than-coal-caused smoke.
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rulings invalidated unrealistic ordinances and thereby occasionally
forced the legislature to rethink its premises. 6 2 But the common law
method of reasoning by analogy more often encouraged judges and
lawyers to consider competing values only within the bounds of
familiar rationales. This limited approach was evident in the universal
use of private nuisance theories; experimentation with other doctrines, such as res ipsa loquitur or trespass, might hve reallocated the
burden of proof to the defendant-polluter.6 3
Satisfaction with past policy did not merely permit the twentieth
century I decisionmaker to neglect consideration of all the consequences of his decision. It also allowed him to omit from his
deliberations elements that were in fact relevant, which in turn
allowed him artificially to limit the scope of the potential solution.
Take the case of the franchise. Franchises were required in situations
where, because of the diffuse but important impact of particular
economic activities on many people, special legal permission was
needed to carry on the activity. Yet, while railroads and power plants
needed these franchises before they could operate in cities, law failed
to use the leverage of the franchise as a means of regulating the social
costs of these activities. In fact, once granted, the franchise was often
judicially interpreted as giving the holder a municipal license to
create social costs. As one court stated when it struck down the
Jersey City smoke ordinance of 1909:
The chartered right of a railroad to operate its line includes the right

to make such noise, smoke and smells as are reasonably unavoidable
.,

even if some injury and some damage to property is caused

thereby. 6 4

2. Default to the market
The preponderance of drift does not mean that law responded to
changing situations in an aimless fashion. It is true that a great deal
of law came out of the cumulative drift of past policy rather than
out of effort directed at updating basic decisions. But absence of
alternative criteria for public policy had the effect of encouraging
Nor was there any concern expressed as to whether supplies of non-polluting hard coal
might be exhausted some day.
62. See People v. Cunard White Star, 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E.2d 489 (1939). The White
Star court declared invalid a New York City ordinance that prohibited all smoke (New
York, N.Y., Sanitary Code, ch. 20, art. 12, § 211). The court found that it was impossible,
even with the most modern equipment, always to avoid the production of smoke.
63. See, e.g., Comment, The Application of Res lpsa Loquitur in Suits Against Multiple
Defendants, 34 Albany L. Rev. 106 (1969).
64. Erie R.R. Co. v. Mayor, etc., of Jersey City, 83 N.J.L. 92, 84 A. 697, aff'd mem., 84
N.J.L. 761, 87 A. 467 (1912). But see Tuebner v. California Street Railway Co., 66 Cal.
171, 4 P. 1162 (1884).
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law to respond to the functional demands of the most powerful
economic institution-the market. If one looks at the pre-1930 common law of pollution control, for example, one finds reflected a
dominant pattern of priorities largely set by market needs. Judges, in
particular, were unable to reconcile abatement of pollution's widely
scattered social costs with other, more pressing economic requirements. Society was more sensitive to vital services than to the
unpleasant effects of these services. Law, in turn, was not to be used
to deter polluting activities when to do so might disrupt the flow of
economic benefits these activities produced. In short, drift in environmental policy did not so much result in haphazard decisionmaking as it did in deliberate default to the market. Men may have
had faith in the ability of their legal institutions to control situations.
But until these institutions were given direction, the situation too
often controlled them.
This legal default to market forces was judicially manifested in
three forms. First, courts displayed a penchant for protecting "key"
polluter activities from the claims of private litigants. Railroads and
steamships guaranteed transportation between interstate markets,
and it was thought that such operations should not be enjoined for a
mere smoke nuisance.6 I A city's manufacturing interests were just as
critical to the proper functioning of the market. Accordingly, some
early smoke statutes specifically excluded manufacturing establishments from their scope.6 6 When city ordinances did not make this
exception, courts would hold the ordinances invalid because "great
cities depend for their existence upon industry and commerce."67
Second, courts were reluctant to grant plaintiffs equitable relief
whenever the anticipated multiplier effects of an injunction seemed
too great. Typically, if it appeared that injunctive relief might adversely affect economic spin-off benefits generated by the polluter,
then the injunction would be denied. Thus, in Madison v. Ducktown
Sulphur, Copper and Iron Co.,6 8 the court refused to enjoin smokeproducing operations at defendant's plant because 12,000 people
depended on its payroll and because the tax assessment against the
65. See McMorran v. Cleveland-Cliffs Iron Co., 253 Mich. 65, 234 N.W. 163 (1931)
(refusal to restrain vessels engaged in navigation from emitting smoke at dock); Pettit v. New
York Cent. and H.R. R. Co., 80 Hun. 86, 29 N.Y. S.1137 (1894) (refusal to grant plaintiff
damages from smoke emitted by railroad pumping station).
66. See Laws of 1899, ch. 375, Minn. Statutes. Chapter 375 gave St. Paul the power to
prohibit dense smoke but provided, "nothing shall be construed to apply to manufacturing
establishments."
67. People v. Cunard White Star, 280 N.Y. 413, 21 N.E.2d 489 (1939). See also
Commonwealth of Pa. v. Standard Ice Co., 59 P.L.J. 101, 9 J.L.R. 270 (Quar. Sess. 1910).
68. 113 Tenn. 331, 83 S.W. 658 (1904).
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plant was one half of the tax aggregate of the entire county. In
DeBlois v. Bowers,6 9 an injunction was denied on account of the
"line [to be] drawn between interests of a community in its industrial establishment which give occupation to its inhabitants and
revenue in the form of taxes and ... individuals who are annoyed
[by fumes]."" In Bartel v. Ridgefield Lumber Co., 7 the court

denied injunctive relief against a major air polluter because of the
importance of the lumbering business to the economy of the state of
Washington. Courts were also afraid of the multiplier effects of stare
decisis; the legal precedent set by a successful plaintiff in one case
might force the courts to take an economically untenable position in
the future. As one 1911 court admitted: "We cannot shut our eyes
to the obvious truth that if the running of this [polluting] mill can
be enjoined, almost any manufactory can be enjoined." '7 2
Third, by protecting polluter interests from city ordinances and
private suitors, court decisions advanced the dynamics of increased
productivity at the expense of non-market environmental values that
did not find expression in bargained transactions. Judicial responses
to air pollution generally embodied the notion that active, productive use of land leading to market-measured economic growth was
preferable to the passive, diffuse interests of unorganized pollution
receptors. Thus, in 1897, a court struck down a St. Louis ordinance
prohibiting the sale of highly polluting soft coal in part because "St.
Louis has attained its growth in population and wealth in large
degree from the fact of its proximity to the great mines of bituminous coal. .

. ."'

Forty seven years later an Illinois court justified its

decision to void a city dense smoke ordinance on the grounds that
"people residing in industrial communities must bear ... the detriment occasioned by industries of the community." 7 4
This hierarchy of values was even more evident when individual
plaintiffs sought equitable relief in the context of private litigation.
Judges usually assessed market utility far more important than clean
air. Thus, when it came time to "balance the equities" in a particular
lawsuit, it was easy for courts to conclude that the widely-felt economic value of polluting industry outweighed individual interests in
smoke abatement. As one court reasoned when it refused to enjoin
69. 44 F.2d 621 (D. Mass. 1930).
70. Id.
71. 131 Wash. 183, 229 P. 306 (1924).
72. Union Planter's Bank and Trust Co. v. Memphis Hotel Co., 124 Tenn. 649, 139 S.W.
715 (1911).
73. St. Louis v. Edward Heitzeberg Packing and Provision Co., 141 No. 375, 42 S.W. 954
(1897). See also St. Louis v. Regina Flour Mill Co., 141 Mo. 389, 42 S.W. 1148 (1897).
74. City of Kankakee v. New York Cent. R. Co., 387 111.109, 55 N.E.2d 87 (1944).
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the operation of a defendant's coke ovens: "The interest of the
public ...in vast allied and dependent industries ...is higher than
that of the individual."'7
CONCLUSION

All this favor for industrial growth suggests there may be one
further reason for the lack of impact of legal rules on pre-1930
polluter behavior. Drift, default, drug store law, underdeveloped
agencies and an absence of technical knowledge played their part.
But there is reason to find also that legal institutions deliberately
shielded polluter interests from the full force and potential of a more
comprehensive public policy. 7 6 Although the record is unclear, the
question is ripe for further study. For legal protection of polluting
activities is only a shorthand for law-sanctioned promotion of the
economic exchange values embodied in these activities. And if it is
the character of law to be responsive to a society's dominant values,
75. Robb v. Carnegie Bros. & Co., 145 Pa. 324, 22 A. 649 (1891). The language of other
twentieth century I court opinions reflected a similar ranking of values. In Elliott Nursery v.
Duquesne Light Co., 281 Pa. 166, 126 A. 345 (1924), the court denied an injunction against
a municipal power plant because "[tI hose living and carrying on their affairs [in the city
centers] ... have been required for generations to put up with the disadvantages which
result from ...industrial activities in order that they may be carried on." In Reber v. I11.
Cent. R. Co., 163 Miss. 164, 138 So. 574 (1932), the court held it would not enjoin a
railroad roundhouse because "[tI he public welfare requires that industry have some adobe
where it can function without molestation." The court in Holman v. Athens Empire
Laundry Co., 149 Ga. 345, 100 S.E. 207 (1919) went even further. Plaintiff was there
denied injunctive relief when the court flatly declared "[tihe pollution of the air...
indispensable to the progress of society, is not actionable."
76. See generally notes 65-75 and accompanying text supra. Even when courts upheld
the validity of city smoke ordinances, the judge's opinion sometimes revealed that the
decision might have been otherwise if the courts had not been satisfied that certain economic pre-conditions had been fulfilled. For example, although the New York dense smoke
ordinance was upheld in People v. New York Edison, 159 App. Div. 786, 144 N.Y.S. 707
(1913), the court warned: ". . . [T] he discharge of dense smoke ...would not constitute
such a menace to public health ...as to sustain thy prohibition thereof . . . if that would
render it impossible to use private property for business purposes .... The Minneapolis
smoke ordinance of 1909 was upheld in State v. Chicago, M. and St. P. Ry. Co., 114 Minn.
122, 130 N.W. 545 (1911), when the court decided that to require the defendant railroad
company to change to smokeless coal would not create too great a hardship.
Similar sentiments were expressed when courts granted the aggrieved plaintiff injunctive
relief. The majority of a sharply divided court in Sullivan v. Jones and Laughlin Steel Co.,
208 Pa. 540, 57 A. 1065 (1904), granted an injunction preventing an industrial polluter
from expanding its operations. The dissent would have refused equitable relief because of
the wages paid and the number of people employed by the defendant. In Price v. Philip
Carey Mfg. Co., 310 Pa. 557, 165 A.B49 (1933), the court agreed to require the polluting
plant to purchase a smoke control device but made it clear that the result would have been
different had the plaintiff asked the plant to cease operations. See also Tuebner v. California
Street Railway Co., 66 Cal. 171, 4 P. 1162 (1884), where the upper court sustained a jury
verdict against a defendant-polluter only because "... the damages found [by the jury] for
the injury suffered are not excessive ......
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then it may be that pollution control law is bound to fail so long as
(1) America prizes market-defined economic growth; and (2) pollution producers epitomize desired, market-oriented economic values.
It is a pessimistic forecast, but one nonetheless implied by the post1880 pollution story.

